The Issue of Time
in Nishida Kitarô’s *A Study of the Good*

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1. Introduction

This paper attempts to track down the concept of time held by the early Nishida Kitarô. What appears as a rather unlikely topic when looking at *A Study of the Good* turns out to be much more central to Nishida’s philosophy from his second work *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness* on, when Nishida is clearly influenced by Henri Bergson and his concept of “pure duration”. Reflections about time become important for Nishida insofar as one element of his early philosophy is the emphasis on the unity of consciousness over time, which again informs his central notion of “an unchanging unity at the base of consciousness”.

As to the method of actual proceeding, Nishida’s well-known eclecticism suggests a treatment of potential predecessors before one tries to grasp what Nishida himself has to say. Before thematizing the influence of Bergson that I have already mentioned, I will therefore take one brief look at what I see to be the classic philosophical formulation of the problem of time, namely that of Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (Chapter II). After this, another look will be dedicated to Bergson, whom one might legitimately call Nishida’s greatest influence for the concept of time. The latest available publication of Bergson for Nishida at the time of writing his first works was *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (here taken up in Chapter III). In both cases, Kant and Bergson, a brief outline of the general framework of ideas and intentions will precede the actual treatment of the concept of time in order to be able to perceive the latter’s position and function in that larger framework.

Most of my discussion of Nishida himself will accordingly also be informed by how he poses himself between these two fundamental positions lying before him. Does he form his own position after these models, or does he rather portray these models in accordance to his own model established independently of them, or does he take a middle route, using and transforming certain elements he finds and taking up others to shape his own thoughts? The paper will not only attempt to show how he takes his stand in this regard, but also when. It seems to be fairly well visible at what
time Nishida read Bergson intensively and incorporated him into his own philosophy as well as at what point of time he comes to terms with the difficulties posed for him by the Kantian idea of time.

2. Kant

a) General Overview

Put in simple terms, Immanuel Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*\(^1\) belongs to the category of philosophical works concerned with epistemology, i.e. with how human cognition works. What makes Kant so different from his predecessors that one usually speaks of his achieving a “Copernican Revolution” is that he in this endeavor focuses on the side of the perceiver rather than the perceived. That is to say, Kant is not concerned with investigating things in themselves but rather with phenomena, phenomena being things in perception, i.e. things that cannot be thought without perception. Kant also defines phenomena as “objects of empirical perception” or “possible objects of experience”,\(^2\) i.e., he takes the step back from the things themselves to our experience of them because this is the only domain that he feels he is able to make valid statements about and thus the only one that can satisfy his demands for scientificity.

Again speaking in basic terms, Kant differentiates between two elements of human perception in general, namely matter and form. The former corresponds to sensations, which are given a posteriori; something, however, must already be there that orders these sensations, and this is the “form” of phenomena, necessarily given a priori.\(^3\) This form of perception is what Kant undertakes to examine in the “Transcendental Aesthetics” chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and he does so by separating from an imagined perception everything that is not a priori. First he wants to isolate concepts added on by reason (Kant: “die Sinnlichkeit isoliren”) and then,

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2 Kant, p. 33.
3 Kant, p. 34.
from the empirical intuition that remains after this procedure, everything pertaining to sensation. What then remains Kant calls “reine Anschauung und die bloße Form der Erscheinungen” (pure intuition and the mere form of the phenomena) and the latter can be divided into two forms, namely space and time.\(^4\)

b) Time

Time, thus, in Kant’s framework is an a priori necessary concept lying at the bottom of all perception. While perception may be imagined to be without phenomena, one cannot imagine it without time: this is what “a priori” means. This time, however, is not to be found inside objects; indeed, when speaking about “objects”, time becomes irrelevant. That is because time is only then a priori necessary if one looks at phenomena, i.e. objects in perception. The ontological status of time therefore is somewhat limited. As Kant says: “We deny time any absolute reality in the sense that it inhere objects as condition or characteristic without consideration of the form of our empirical perception.”\(^5\) The reality of time, therefore, is of an empirical nature; time possesses “empirical reality” and “transcendental ideality”.\(^6\)

These fundamental postulations lead Kant to a number of more detailed observations about the nature of time, his “axioms of time”: There is only one time; if one speaks of different times these can only be thought of as parts of the one time. This one time is unidirectional; different times are thus successive parts of the one time. This one time is infinite; if one speaks of certain lengths of time one can only think of these as limitations of the one infinite time.\(^7\)

All characteristics of time except the property of succession can be represented by drawing an infinite straight line:

Because this inner intuition [of time] gives no shape [for us to imagine], we seek

\(^4\) Kant, p. 36.

\(^5\) Kant, p. 52. Incidentally, the same holds true for space, as Kant argued on pp. 37-45. The argument about space runs almost exactly parallel as that for time, with the exception that Kant holds time to be even more important. Space, says Kant, is only the a priori formal condition of exterior phenomena, while time is a necessary form of perception for both exterior as well as interior phenomena and thus deserves to be called “the formal a priori condition of all phenomena whatsoever” (p. 50).

\(^6\) Kant, p. 48.
to supplement this lack by analogies and imagine the succession of time by a line proceeding into the infinite, in which line the manifold things are represented by a row of only one dimension. From the characteristics of this line we make conclusions about all characteristics of time except for the one that the parts of the former [i.e. the line] are all at the same time, those of the latter [i.e. time], however, always one after the other.  

Speaking more concretely about how the relations of time in phenomena manifest themselves in rules, Kant identifies three modi of time: permanence, succession, and co-existence. Permanence refers to the demand that time had to lie permanently at the bottom of everything perceived. If there was no permanence of time, we could not tell whether things followed upon each other (succession) or existed at the same time (co-existence); relations of time are only possible in permanence of time. These two submodes of succession and co-existence visible against the backdrop of permanence do not themselves pertain to time itself, but to all phenomena in time, which can be seen to either succeed each other or to co-exist with one another.  

A brief look at what Kant has to say about movement, motion, and change will be interesting for a later comparison with Bergson. According to Kant, movement contains a combination of time and space and also necessitates something empirical, thus disqualifying itself for being an element of transcendental aesthetics, i.e. a form of perception:

Even the concept of movement, which integrates both pieces [i.e. space and time] presupposes something empirical. For movement presupposes the perception of something movable. In space, however, viewed in itself, there is nothing movable; so that the movable must be something that is found in space only via experience, therefore an empirical datum.  

In the same way, transcendental aesthetics cannot count the concept of change among its a priori data; for time itself does not change, but something that is in time. Change thus demands the perception of some existence and the succession of its provisions, in one word: experience.  

Accordingly, movement and change are not fundamental categories, but only introduced in perception through experience of something concrete on the basis of the forms of time and space.

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8 Kant, p. 50.  
10 Kant, p. 58.  
11 Kant, p. 58.
To summarize, time in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*, while denied the ontological status of absolute reality, still plays a central part in that it necessarily accompanies every human perception which (in contrast to dealing with things themselves) is what Kant is concerned with in the first place.

### 3. Bergson

a) General Overview

Henri Bergson’s clearest and best known statement of his early intuition-based metaphysics (i.e. before his philosophy developed into different directions, more and more influenced by Catholicism) can be found in his *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. In it, he differentiates between two kinds of metaphysics that can historically be found in philosophy: one that views objects from the outside and one that attempts to enter into objects by an effort of imagination. The former yielded only relative knowledge, “the second, in those cases where it is possible,” enabled one “to attain the *absolute*” because it “neither depends on a point of view nor relies on any symbol.”

Calling the second type of metaphysics “absolute” for Bergson involves a value statement; he also calls it “perfection”, while a description with a point of view grounded in the outside world necessarily remained incomplete and relative. This absolute (which Bergson also calls infinite) cannot be grasped by intellectual analysis, but only by an effort of intuition, a central term in Bergson’s writings:

> [... *An absolute could only be given in an intuition, whilst everything else falls within the province of analysis. By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible.*]

The opposite of this intuition, intellectual analysis, is mainly hindered by its incessant tendency to conceptualize, to translate unknown elements into those already known:

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13 Bergson, p. 21.
14 Bergson, p. 22.
To analyze, therefore, is to express a thing as a function of something other than itself. All analysis is thus translation, a development into symbols, a representation taken from successive points of view from which we note as many resemblances as possible between the new object which we are studying and others which we believe we know already.\textsuperscript{16}

Bergson’s favored mode of intuitive inquiry, in contrast, is simple and does not have to rely on falsifying translations, or, in his own words: “\textit{Metaphysics, then, is the science which claims to dispense with symbols.”}\textsuperscript{17}

b) Time

Explicating further, then, what characterizes this intuition, Bergson notes that there is surely at least one reality that everyone accesses from within (i.e. by intuition), and that is one’s own self. The most fundamental characteristic of the self which we thus intuitively perceive Bergson immediately identifies as duration. Regardless of all superficial impressions that one’s own being rests on clearly cut separable perceptions which together form a static entity, Bergson insists:

\begin{quote}
But if I draw myself in from the periphery towards the center, if I search in the depth of my being that which is most uniformly, most constantly, and most endurably myself, I find an altogether different thing. There is, beneath these sharply cut crystals and this frozen surface, a continuous flux which is not comparable to any flux I have ever seen. There is a succession of states, each of which announces that which follows and contains that which precedes it.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

In connection with this notion of duration that characterizes the second type of metaphysics as mentioned above, Bergson says that the usual variant of metaphysics in contrast deals with immobile states that conceptualize time in terms of spatialization such as the movement of the hands of a watch. He explicitly criticizes moves to arrive at a better understanding of time through analogies to a drawn line (which Kant resorts to, see above p. 3). Rather, Bergson demands that attention be given to the action by which the line is traced: “Let us bear in mind that this action, in spite of its duration, is indivisible if accomplished without stopping, that if a stopping is inserted, we have two actions instead of one, [...] and that it is not the moving action itself which is divisible,

\textsuperscript{15} Bergson, pp. 23f.
\textsuperscript{16} Bergson, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{17} Bergson, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{18} Bergson, p. 25.
but, rather, the stationary line it leaves behind it as its track in space.”

If one then also leaves behind that notion of space one gets a truer image of time as consisting of a flux of duration.

Why does Bergson think this duration is so fundamental in individuals, or, where can one see that it is so fundamental? The answer is: in the persistence of memory. Again, he contrasts intuitive metaphysics to intellectual analysis (which he also identifies as “science”): Science needed isolated, immutable elements for its proper development.

But, then, I cannot escape the objection that there is no state of mind, however simple, which does not change every moment, since there is no consciousness without memory, and no continuation of a state without the addition, to the present feeling of the memory of past moments. It is this which constitutes duration. Inner duration is the continuous life of a memory which prolongs the past into the present, the present either containing within it in a distinct form the ceaselessly growing image of the past, or more probably, showing by its continual change of quality the heavier and still heavier load we drag behind us as we grow older.

It is this function of memory which makes duration possible in the first place, for without it “there would only be instantaneity.”

Our daily workings with measurements of time or comparison of different time spans, just as the scientific intellectual analysis, are based on an artificial construction of an unchanging immobility to which we then assign short time spans or durations. While this is designed to facilitate our daily life, the state of time “must again be set in movement in order to bring it back from the abstract schematic thing it has become to the concrete state it was at first” in a true metaphysics.

The most important example of an artificial reconstruction of the real by making it immobile Bergson mentions is that of movement. Movement, according to Bergson, is usually imagined by looking at possible stoppages along the way, an infinite number of which are then supposed to make up movement. In contrast, “[t]he moving body is never really in any of the points; the most we can say is that it passes through them. But passage, which is movement, has nothing in common with stoppage, which is

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19 Bergson, pp. 26f.
20 Bergson, p. 40.
21 Bergson, p. 40.
22 Bergson, p. 41.
immobility.” The whole procedure, Bergson insists, is wrong from the outset in that it assumes immobility (isolated points) to be the basic facts and from them tries to induce movement. In reality, it was the other way round: “It is movement that we must accustom ourselves to look upon as simplest and clearest, immobility being only the extreme limit of the slowing down of movement, a limit reached only, perhaps, in thought and never realized in nature.”

One obvious criticism against the lack of clarity of the concept of duration is taken on explicitly by Bergson. From a conventional point of view the concept of duration would involve a contradiction in that it involves a multiplicity of moments and at one and the same time possesses a unity symbolized by the idea of the “flux” of duration. Bergson claims that neither of the two alone could account for a full view of his “duration”:

> Looked at from the point of view of multiplicity, then, duration disintegrates into a powder of moments, none of which endures, each being an instantaneous. If, on the other hand, I consider the unity which binds the moments together, this cannot endure either, since by hypothesis everything that is changing, and everything that is really durable in the duration, has been put to the account of the multiplicity of moments.

In this way, a concept of time (identified as duration) stands at the very heart of Bergson’s idea of metaphysics. This notion of time differs from Kant in a number of respects, the most important being that time has objective reality and can be perceived directly, namely via intuition. Intellectual perception, in contrast, for Bergson rather seems to involve a misconception of time, while for Kant, of course, time plays a crucial role as one of the forms of possibility of perception.

4. Nishida

a) A Study of the Good

A look at the second part (“Reality”) of *A Study of the Good* (the part of the book

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23 Bergson, p. 42.  
24 Bergson, p. 43.  
25 Bergson, p. 47.  
26 Nishida Kitārō, Abe Masao/Ives, Christopher (transl.), *An Inquiry into the Good*, New Haven:
written and published first before the four parts were put together as this book) immediately reveals that the concept of time does not really play a role of import there at all. There is in fact only one short discussion of “time” throughout the whole part.

In the chapter “The Sole Reality”, Nishida attempts to argue that different consciousnesses are connected, not only in a simultaneous union, but also over time. Nishida criticizes “some thinkers” who maintain that yesterday’s and today’s consciousness of one and the same person are totally unrelated. The mistake Nishida claims to discern in these thinkers is that they presuppose an objective reality of time in which phenomena of consciousness are held to appear. Nishida, however, reverses the relationship between consciousness and time, saying: “Because time is nothing more than a form that orders the content of our experience, the content of consciousness must first be able to be joined, be united, and become one in order for the idea of time to arise.”

Nishida then continues by emphasizing his idea of the “unifying activity of consciousness”, which for him lies at base of consciousness before everything else, so that time, as well, can only be a secondary phenomenon: “The unifying activity of consciousness is not controlled by time; on the contrary, time is established by the unifying activity. At the base of consciousness there is a transcendent, unchanging reality apart from time.”

Time is thus, in a fundamentally Kantian way, seen as a form that orders our experience. The evaluation Nishida gives of this time, however, differs from Kant in that he qualifies time by inserting that it is “nothing more” than a form ordering our experience. The reason for this qualification is clear: Nishida wishes to stress that which lies beneath time, namely his “unifying activity of consciousness”, that is also the agent that creates time.

The first part of *A Study of the Good* (“Pure Experience”), following from its occupation with the direct experience Nishida takes as the basis of his reflections on reality, stresses the presentness of this direct experience, e.g. when Nishida says: “The focus of consciousness is at all times the present, and the sphere of pure experience

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27 Nishida, *Study*, p. 60.
28 Nishida, *Study*, pp. 60f.
coincides with the sphere of attention.”

What sounds here as if Nishida wanted to deny the importance of continuation at all (which would be quite surprising in light of his earlier emphasis on connectedness of memory in part two), is qualified once Nishida transcends the description of direct experience itself:

[...] Consciousness is not stuck in its present, for it implicitly relates to other consciousnesses. The present can always be seen as a part of a great system [...] When it relates to the past through memory and to the future through the will, does pure experience transcend the present? [...] From the standpoint of pure experience, must we not consider consciousnesses with identical content as being identical? [...] Even when a unifying activity is interrupted in its functioning through time, we must still consider it a single entity.

And, connecting the main topics of the second and first parts, i.e. the unifying activity of consciousness and direct experience, Nishida says: “[...] From the standpoint of pure experience in the strict sense, experience is not bound to such forms as time, space, and individual persons; rather, these discriminations derive from an intuition that transcends them.”

One can discern here first moves by Nishida to leave behind the Kantian notion of time as a form of experience; we shall see what happens to these moves in Nishida’s further works.

b) “Beruguson no junsui jizoku” (ベルグソンの純粋持続)

After publishing A Study of the Good in 1911, Nishida in the same year published a short article on Bergson called “Beruguson no junsui jizoku” (ベルグソンの純粋持続, “Bergson’s Pure Duration”). In it, he undertakes to summarize very briefly (at the same time disclaiming his aptitude to do so) the main ideas of Bergson, focusing mainly on An Introduction to Metaphysics. Formally similarly to Bergson, Nishida starts out by differentiating between two types of metaphysics, namely those grounded on a rational principle and those grounded on experience. The first group relied on artificial rational constructions in their attempts at grasping experience, while the latter, to which Bergson belonged, arrived at a purer notion of experience. This more direct

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29 Nishida, Study, pp. 5f.
30 Nishida, Study, p. 10.
31 Nishida, Study, p. 31.
The access of experience led Bergson to his idea of pure duration.\(^{33}\)

The most important aspect of this duration stressed by Nishida is that it means that “the change of our always unitary consciousness must be constantly continuing”\(^{34}\), which is an apt adoption of Bergson’s argument about the contradiction between constancy and change necessarily inherent in duration (s. above p. 8).

Another point particularly stressed by Nishida is the importance of the past as our creator: “Our present is not a present that has no past at all, but a present that has developed out of our past itself, and our future again is the future that will develop out of this present itself.”\(^{35}\) The actual actor of this creation of ours out of the past Nishida identifies as our memory, again closely arguing in Bergson’s vein (s. above, p. 7).

A last point Nishida picks up as central concerns the problem whether Bergson’s pure duration necessarily leads to some fixed point. One might well argue that the idea of pure duration as a flux from the past to the future points to a mechanistic teleological conception. According to Nishida’s interpretation, however, neither is true for Bergson. Rather, employing a simile drawn from *Hyakunin-isshu*,\(^{36}\) Nishida compares the flux of pure duration to a boatsman who has lost his rudder and now flows on the water not knowing where he is going. Nishida argues that Bergson’s “pure duration” basically aimed at something similar and that the flux of pure duration really pointed to the freedom of will.

c) *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness*

*Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness*\(^{37}\) was not published until 1941, but contains writings Nishida had published since 1913, thus showing the development of

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35a “我々の現在は決して過去のない現在ではない、我々の過去が自ら発展して来た現在である、我々の未来は又此現在が自ら発展して行く未来である。” (Nishida, “Beruguson”, p. 329).
Nishida’s thought right after he had published of *A Study of the Good* and written “Beruguson no junsui jizoku”.

The first of these writings incorporated into *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness* is “Self-Consciousness: Some Problems” (first published in 1913). The very first sentence of this essay is quite illuminating to see how Nishida has clearly incorporated some of Bergson’s ideas since his 1911 article: “Intuition is a consciousness of unbroken progression, of reality just as it is, wherein subject and object are not as yet divided and that which knows and that which is known are one.”

Instead of emphasizing the presentness of direct experience as the starting point of his inquiry as he had done some years earlier (s. above, p. 9), he begins with a notion of intuition that has a quite definite Bergsonian ring to it.

To be sure, Nishida does something quite different with this intuition than Bergson; that is to say, he introduces the concept of reflection, which stands outside the unbroken progression of intuition and views it from the outside. This reflection of the self upon the self, already seen in *A Study of the Good* where Nishida had held that the self reflecting on the self could never get a hold of the real self but only of an inferior objectified version of the self, Nishida now portrays as taking place in self-consciousness, which becomes the central focus of his argument. For it is this self-consciousness which is identified as the constant unifying reality at the base of all consciousness, known as the central focus of discussion of part two of *A Study of the Good* (s. above, p. 9).

In this first article Nishida can still be seen to deal with time as one of the forms of experience in the Kantian sense, similar to what was seen in *A Study of the Good* (s. above, p. 9), at least as his starting point for further-reaching arguments, such as his claim that perception is necessarily connected with value judgments: “I think that anyone who follows Kant’s epistemology will allow that the thinking of experience in

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38 Nishida, *Intuition*, p. 3.
40 There seems to be a considerable degree of conceptual confusion in this first chapter of *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness*. “Intuition”, which had first been introduced as an object of reflection which takes place in self-consciousness, a little later is seen as the place where this self-consciousness is realized, e.g. in: “the fact of self-consciousness [...] can only be explained as the merging of subject and object in what can only be called an intellectual intuition, an immediate and basic fact of consciousness which cannot be further explained.” (Nishida, *Intuition*, p. 7).
accord with the forms of space, time and causation, in accord, that is, with the
categories of existence, is already based on an ‘ought’, that is, on value...”

Nishida’s way of taking up Bergson is further clarified by a second essay
included in *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness*; “Consciousness of Rectilinearity”,
first published in 1916. In it, Nishida openly criticizes Bergson for having overlooked
that there is something more fundamental than time:

> If, as Bergson says, pure time is unrepeatable, the reason must be that there is
something at its foundation which transcends time. Bergson’s excessive attachment
to the idea of time causes him to overlook this aspect of unity which transcends
movement. At the vanguard of the *élan vital*, there is neither space nor time; as Faust
declares, ‘In the beginning was the Act.’ This act is not a temporal act, but
something more immediate and fundamental than space and time; it is the
development of reason itself.

While the sudden reference to reason comes as something of a surprise, it is not new
for us to see Nishida claiming that there is some more fundamental unity beneath time.

In a third essay he also directly criticizes Bergson’s statement that the past could
not be repeated because of the unilinearity of the pure duration: “Memory makes the
past present; it thus transcends time, and is immediately identical with the action which
anticipates the future. Memory transcends the present self, returns to the base, and
unifies thence the entirety of the individual self; ...” While Nishida, thus, willingly
accepts Bergson’s pure duration as helping him to stress his point about the identity of
consciousnesses usually thought to be separated through time, he rejects those parts of
Bergson’s theory that do not coincide with this theory of his, such as the
non-repeatability of the past.

We had seen before that Nishida, while not being able to escape the Kantian
premise of time as an a priori form of experience theoretically, at the same time tended
to try to diminish the position of this time as opposed to his “unifying base of reality”
(see above, p. 10). “Spirit and Matter” also shows what Nishida does with the Kantian
conception of time as soon as he sees a chance to do away with it:

> The true beginnings of the universe lie, not in the distant past of the nebulas,
but in the center of inner creation. As relativity theory shows, absolute time is an
ideal without a secure basis in actuality, and the selection of the coordinates of
physical phenomena, as we arrange experiential content in the form of space, is

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Relativity theory, thus, according to Nishida showed that time cannot really serve to order our experience, so that only space remains as the other of the two forms of experience Kant had identified in his transcendental aesthetics.

5. Conclusion

In this paper I have attempted first to lay out two classical positions taken towards time and then to describe how Nishida developed a stand towards these positions. Although there have been treatments of time before him, which I have not mentioned in this paper (particularly the major positions taken by Zeno of Elea in his paradoxes, Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*, and Augustine in his *Confessions*), certainly the greatest influence on other thinkers on the subject since the beginning of the 19th century up to the middle of the 20th century was Kant and his idea of time (and space) as a transcendental a priori form of perception. Bergson, in contrast, had developed an alternative model in which time, in the form of “pure duration” took on a much more central role, not merely informing the process of perception, but lying at the ground of all being.

Nishida, as could be seen in *A Study of the Good*, is certainly influenced by Kant\(^4\) in that he first accepts as a matter of course that time is one of the categories in which perception is ordered. On the other hand, he is much more interested in stressing that there is something much more fundamental beyond such categories as time, which are themselves created by this much more fundamental entity. It does therefore not take much to make Nishida (rather randomly) take up relativity theory to distance himself from time as an important category of perception in order to show instead that “experience is not bound to such categories.”

\(^{44}\) Nishida, *Intuition*, p. 116. A similar statement can be found on p. 130.

\(^{45}\) It would probably more correct to say that he was directly influenced by neo-Kantians such as Rickert; it might be worthwhile to examine whether the latter’s concept of time differed from Kant’s.
Nishida proceeds in a formally similar manner with Bergson’s thought. While he approves of certain aspects of the idea of pure duration as serving an emphasis of his own points, he criticizes others that are essentially linked to the core of what Bergsons wishes to say but do not fit into his own scheme. Nishida, therefore, appears to be very skilled in drawing on other authors for isolated ideas that seem to resemble his own. These he incorporates, down to terminology, albeit without necessarily taking seriously the contexts and larger framework that they derive from and ignoring implications that he sees as running contrary to his own intentions.